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The current technoscientific progress has led to a sectorization in the philosophy of science. Today the 
philosophy of science isn't is informal interested in studying old problems about the general characteristics 
of scientific practice. The interest of the philosopher of science is the study of concepts, problems and riddles 
of particular disciplines. Then, within this progress of philosophy of science, neuroscientific research stands 
out, because it invades issues traditionally addressed by the humanities, such as the nature of consciousness, 
action, knowledge, normativity, etc. As a result, the new area of interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and 
philosophy arises: neurophilosophy. This emerging area applies neuroscientific concepts to traditional 
philosophical questions, limiting their responses to neuroscientific revelations about nervous systems. 
Neurophilosophy research focuses on problems related to the indirect nature of mind and brain,1 
computational or representative analysis of brain process,2 relationships between psychological and 
neuroscientific research,3 adequate adaptations of physical and philosophical concepts in neuroscience4 and 
the place of cognitive functions.5 
Now, the temporal representation of conscious experience and the types of the neural architecture to 
represent objects in time6 have aroused scientific interest. Under these interests, we focus on the studies on 
the temporary triadic structure of phenomenological consciousness in Dan Lloyd7 and Rick Grush.8 From 
Grush’s studies, the importance of Kantian ideas for cognitive neuroscience emerges, due to the active way 
in which Kant conceived space and time as forms of intuition, within which the mind interprets its experience. 
Under this perspective, the theoretical arguments of Dennett-Kinsbourne9 and Eagleman-Sejnowski10 
represent winks in the direction of Kant-Husserl within the neuroscientific goal while considering that the 
contents provided by the mind included space, objects and perception of causal relationships. Then, theories 
of cognitive neuroscience are beginning to suggest that these elements are also, as Kant argued, interpretative 
elaborations provided by mind / brain, and not only content received from outside. In other words, current 
cognitive neuroscientific theories try to pass from its Humean phase to a Kantian phase. So, the challenge 
has been to explain that these elements are provided by the mind and the world itself, and how they have the 
content they have come from. These are lacking in current studies. Filling this gap helps to involve the 
analysis of the scientist’s experience in his theoretical attitude. 
In this sense, an investigation under the Kantian-Husserlian approach that involves pure intuitions a 
priori with the experience of the scientific and neuroscientific concepts represents a ground-breaking. At 
present, a neurophilosophical study about this does not exist. In this sense, one feasible proposal for research 
would be based on the application of neuroscientific results of Moser-Britt11 to philosophical problems of 
foundational notions in relativistic physics: space, time, space-time, field, etc., under the Kantian-Husserlian 
approach, which allows to demonstrate the multidisciplinary link between neurophilosophy and physics. This 
represents a ground-breaking area in current interests in scientific research, with a positive impact in the field 
of neuroscience, and contributing to the study of abstraction emphasizing the importance of Kant’s 
Copernican turn and Husserl’s phenomenological ideas in the construction of physical theories.  
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